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I.
It is hardly necessary at this time to call special attention to
the practical importance to every member of the community of
the charges made by the railroads. To the vast majority these
charges are an important part of the cost of their food; it is
in the power of the great trunk lines, except where the law can
restrain them, by an increase of rates to cause a famine as
serious as would be caused by a complete failure of the crops.
And to a great number of our people,-to the great farmers of
the interior, to the ranch men of the plains, to the planters of
the South, to the manufacturers of the seaboard, and to the
millions of their employees who are dependent upon their pros-
perity,--railroad charges are of greater immediate importance.
The railroads, if unrestrained by law, can prosper or can ruin
them; they can build up a great and flourishing business, or they
can turn an industrious city into a wilderness again. That power
such as this should be the subject of legal restraint is inevitable;
that the legal qualities and limitations of such restraint should be
of the greatest interest to the profession and to the people at
large is clear. From the earliest times some restraint has been
exercised over such lines of industry as are of vital interest to
* Copyright 1915, by Bruce Wyman, being in large part extracts from
the introductory matter to the Second Edition of Railroad Rate Regula-
tion, reprinted here simultaneously with its publication by the kind
permission of Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York.
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the public. The protection of the weak against the actual
physical violence of the strong is the fundamental function of
government in the modern sense; but of equal importance and
of almost equal antiquity is the protection of the common people
against the greed and oppression of the powerful.
II.
At the time of the beginning of the railroads every inducement
was held out by the authorities of the State to those who would
devote their capital to construction of these highways. In the
early charters the legislatures not only often permitted profits
which to-day would seem incredible, but gave exclusive franchises
to protect the proprietors in getting the returns expected. After
some experience with this policy, however, the legislatures began
to grow cautious about granting exclusive rights for railroad
construction; for it was felt, in accordance with the theory of
political economy then in vogue, that competition would protect
the public in all contingencies. This policy of laissez faire had
hardly been developed when it was discovered that not only did
unrestricted railroad building produce wastes costly to all con-
cerned, but that the inevitable end of all such competition was
a combination of some sort, which would almost inevitably result
in higher rates. There followed a period of legislative control
by direct action, rates being drastically reduced by popular
clamor; but it turned out that much of this legislation was so
ill advised as to practically bring the business of transportation
to a standstill. Not until what may be called our own time has
it been discovered that although control was necessary it could
be better exercised by commissions given jurisdiction to deal
with particular problems upon general principles enounced by
the legislature. Only recently, therefore, has it generally been
appreciated that an administrative body with its elasticity of
procedure can do more to protect the public than any judicial
tribunal with its inherent limitation to private litigation.
The passing of the Act to Regulate Commerce by the Congress
of 1887 marks the beginning of an epoch in the exercise of the
power of the federal government over interstate commerce.
Before that time the control of the conduct of commerce between
the states granted to the nation under the constitution had been
by legislation, taking effect directly by force of its provisions
upon the matters within its scope. A fundamental change was
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wrought by the establishment of a body of experts to effect the
administration of a statute by deciding whether its general pro-
visions were so applicable to particular facts as to call for action
of the government. The constitution of the Interstate Commerce
Commission in 1887 marks the beginning of federal regulation
in this intimate way by delegated power of the businesses affected
by a public interest subject to the jurisdiction of the national
government. It had been worked out into practice in the state
governments to a certain extent during the preceding decade;
and there had been some experience with railroad commissions
with powers over intrastate transportation. But as to interstate
transportation it was doubtful on the decisions of the courts
whether there was any duty resting upon the railroads to make
their charges reasonable and equal to all shippers. At all events,
if there were such duties in respect to interstate transportation
it had become abundantly clear by 1887 that the cumbrous process
of accidental suits by private parties constituted no real check
to stop the railroads in extortionate charging, mitigated only
by competition at junction points, and outright rebating, practiced
openly to get business. Settling beyond question the law against
such dereliction in the duties owed by the railroads to the public
was requisite, but even more necessary was the establishing of
a body specially charged with the enforcement of these rules of
law.
In tracing the rise of commission control of railroad operations
by the federal government one ought really to go back at least
as far as the English Railway and Canal Traffic Acts beginning
in 1854, and the railroad commission laws passed in many of
the states beginning in 1867. Congress in framing this Act to
Regulate Commerce in 1887 laid down in the first four sections
certain general rules: first, that charges must be reasonable;
second, that there should be no more discriminations between
shippers; third, that there should be no undue preferences
between localities; and fourth, that no less should be charged
for a long haul than for a short haul included within it. The
phraseology of these provisions was obviously in the language
of some earlier provisions of existing statutes, and consequently
the interpretation which the courts of those jurisdictions had
already put upon the form of language used has, by a familiar
canon of statutory construction, been held to be persuasive in
later decisions of the courts interpreting the powers of the
Commission under the Act. The limited extent of the scope
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of the jurisdiction of the Commission established by the Act
originally is to be noted. It extended only to carriers by rail-
road engaged in interstate and foreign commerce; it did not
cover carriers by water unless operated under the control of a
railroad; and even now it does not cover port to port business
as such. And as to railroad service itself, the Act did not go
far toward including services incidental to carriage by rail, which
have since been found so necessarily involved with it as to make
the supervision over them by the Commission provided in later
amendments indispensable.
The original Act went no further than to give the Commission
the power to investigate alleged violations of the Act and to
make orders thereon; and jurisdiction was given to the courts
to act in support of such orders. Generally speaking, there was
no idea of giving the Commission anything but supervisory
power over the railroads; the Commission was primarily estab-
lished by the Congress as an investigating body. It did have
powers, however, in addition to conducting general investigations,
to hear particular complaints; but in respect to such complaints,
it had no powers of its own to grant relief. The most that the
Commission could do was to make findings on such complaints,
and its report thereupon could be used as prima facie evidence
in proceedings in the courts based upon the wrongs alleged.
However, the railroads in these subsequent proceedings, which
were virtually regarded as de novo, put in any evidence they
had, and it was more or less of a scandal that the railroads
showed very generally a disposition in important-cases to with-
hold much of their evidence from the Commission and produce
it before the courts, with the result that the courts would very
frequently come to a different conclusion from that which the
Commission had announced.
III.
It was found from the very outset, that the Commission had
not been given in this legislation of 1887 the equipment to carry
out the objects for which it was created, moderate as these were
in their purpose. The Commission was particularly charged with
seeing whether rates were reasonable in themselves, and whether
rebates were being given; but the carriers were not required to
file their schedules of rates so that it could be known how matters
stood, and what was being done. Moreover, although the duty
to investigate conditions and report thereon was imposed upon
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the Commission, its powers to call witnesses and elicit testimony
were by no means sufficient for the purpose. The Amendments
of 1889 and 189i were, therefore, necessary to clear things up
in these two respects, if the Commission was to have any real
power to accomplish the objects for which it was created. In
19o3 the so-called Elkins Act was passed to perfect the Act. In
the first section carriers in interstate commerce are made
criminally responsible for violations of the Act. In the second
section provision is made for bringing into any proceeding before
the Commission all carriers or other persons interested in the
inquiry. In the third section jurisdiction is given to the courts
sitting in equity, at the request of the Commission, to inquire
into and enjoin any infraction of the provisions of the Act.
These suits are prosecuted by the District Attorneys under order
of the Attorney-General, and do not preclude suit by private
persons. And provision has since been made for speedy trial
by expediting such suits.
It seems to have been undoubtedly the intention of the framers
of section 4, the long and short haul clause, to forbid absolutely
the practice of charging more for a shorter haul, unless upon
application to the Commission express permission so to charge
was given. The section, however, was a matter of contention
between the two houses of Congress, and as it was finally passed
the qualifying phrase "under substantially similar circumstances
and conditions" was inserted, without probably any very clear
belief that the meaning of the section was thereby fundamentally
altered. At first the railroads acted upon the supposition that
express permission of the Commission must be obtained accord-
ing to the proviso in the section, if a greater charge was to be
made for the shorter haul, and this seemed to be the view at first
taken by the courts. The philosophy of the Act was that com-
petition would reduce the rates to a fair amount at all competitive
points, and that the fourth section would then keep the rates at
non-competitive points down to the level of the competitive rates.
The courts, however, finally decided, in view of the limitation
of the section to cases where the conditions were substantially
similar, that competition with other carriers would justify a lower
rate for the longer haul; and as practically all cases of the sort
before the passage of the Act had been due to the competition
of other carriers, this decision in effect nullified the whole section,
until, as will be seen later, its force was restored in i9io by
amendment to the Act.
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At the outset the Commission claimed that under the Act it
had the power not merely to forbid an unreasonable rate, but
also to indicate to any railroad what it would regard as a reason-
able rate for any particular service, and that then the railroad
disregarding such recommendation would be subject to the action
of the courts. The lower federal courts, however, from the
beginning denied this power to the Commission. The question
did not reach the Supreme Court of the United States for ten
years, but finally the issue was fairly presented. The Supreme
Court of the United States, in deciding that the Commission had
no power to fix rates, points out how fundamental was the
distinction in administration between the power, judicial in its
character, of finding unreasonable the rates being charged by the
carrier as compared with the power, legislative in its essence,
of giving orders to the carriers as to what rates should be
charged in the future. After that time the Commission under
certain circumstances advised a railroad that in its opinion a
reasonable rate would be no greater than a sum named; but
no attempt was made to go further than this in fixing rates,
until in 19o6, as will be seen, this power was given it by
amendment to the Act.
The attitude of the courts toward the Interstate Commerce
Act caused considerable dissatisfaction, especially in those parts
of the country where the great bulk of freight originates, and
the desire for further regulation culminated in the passage of the
Rate Regulation Act of 19o6. This action of Congress had
been foreshadowed by a very considerable body of similar legisla-
tion in the states just previously. It was characteristic of this
legislation that it confers on the railway commissions the power
of fixing a maximum rate; and the giving of such power to the
Interstate Commerce Commission was in fact the chief object
of those who secured the passage of the Railroad Rate Act.
The decisions of the Supreme Court which had given most dis-
satisfaction were the decision denying the Commission the power
to fix rates and that permitting the carrier to charge a less sum
for a longer haul. In addition to this, certain omissions in the
original Act were found to work badly, in view of the railroad
practices. Most of these defects had been remedied by legisla-
tion in England. It was believed by a large portion of the
shippers* that the railway rates were in many instances too high,
and that favoritism through rebates and other forms of discrimi-
nation were indulged in by various methods by the carriers.
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IV.
The Hepburn Act of 19o6 was put in the form of an amend-
ment to the original Interstate Commerce Act as has been the
practice; and its object was to perfect that Act by an extension
of its scope. It increased the number of commissioners from
five to seven; and their salaries from $7,500 to $o,ooo. It
included in the provisions of the Act express and sleeping-car
companies and pipe lines for the transportation of oil. And
along with the increase in the scope of its jurisdiction there was
a striking change in the extent of its powers. Under the old
law, the Commission was primarily an investigating body, aiding
the legislative branch by showing it the way. Its powers were
hardly more than administrative, being confined largely to super-
vision by inquiry into the course the carriers were taking, rather
than any regulation of their conduct by order. But from now
on the Commission may fairly be said to have combined in its
constitution quasi-judicial functions along with its administrative
duties. It henceforth not merely declares matters of which com-
plaint has been made so improper that relief should be granted;
but it fixes for the future the standard of propriety to be
observed. Since this time it has become a regulating commission
with the fundamental powers characteristic of such bodies. It
remained only to develop those powers still further by subsequent
legislation.
The most important feature of this 19o6 Amendment was that
giving the Commission the power to fix maximum rates. The
fixing of maximum rates already had not been uncommon in the
states; and in other countries it had been usual, if not universal.
In England, maximum rates were fixed, not by the Railway and
Canal Commission, but by the Board of Trade, one of the
executive departments of the government, after due hearing;
and the rates thus fixed were enacted in the form of statute by
Parliament, after an opportunity for hearing before a committee.
The provisions of the Hepburn Act which are still in force were
that upon complaint the Commission, after hearing, shall deter-
mine a reasonable maximum rate, which shall take effect at such
time after thirty days as may be fixed by the Commission, and
shall continue in force not more than two years, unless suspended
or set aside by the Commission or the courts. The carrier
aggrieved may appeal to the courts for an injunction against
the rate so fixed; but no injunction or interlocutory order shall
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be issued without a hearing after five days' notice to the Com-
mission. An appeal from the Circuit Court lies directly to the
Supreme Court, and preference is given to such cases. No
change in rates, even within this maximum, shall be made by the
carriers until after thirty days' notice, unless this period is
shortened by the Commission.
One of the most galling monopolies established by action of
the railroads, and permissible under the original act, was that due
to the use of private facilities. For example, a few great cor-
porations, by contract with the railroads, established a monopoly
of the supply of refrigerator cars for the carriage of perishable
fruit; and a similar and hardly less far-reaching monopoly was
created in tank cars. The evil of the private car line was felt
in two directions: first, the charge to ordinary shippers using the
cars was increased by monopolistic rates; second, the charge to
the owners of the cars was greatly lessened by rebates for the
use of the cars. In the first section of the Hepburn Act it was
provided that the term "transportation" shall include cars and
other vehicles and all instrumentalities and facilities of shipment
or carriage, and that it shall be the duty of every carrier subject
to the provisions of this Act to provide and furnish such trans-
portation upon reasonable request therefor, and to establish just
and reasonable rates applicable thereto. In a later section it was
further provided that if the owner of property transported, fur-
nishes any instrumentality used therein, the charge and allowance
therefor shall be no more than is just and reasonable, and the
Commission may, after hearing on a complaint, determine what is
a reasonable charge as the maximum to be paid by the carrier or
carriers for the service so rendered or for the use of the instru-
mentality so furnished, and fix the same by appropriate order.
Another matter, which was even at that time being considered
as leading to abuses which ought to be brought within the power
of the Commission to remedy, was the matter of the industrial
railways. These are short lines of railway, owned in some con-
nection with the industries which they were primarily designed
to serve; either the corporation owning the industry owns the
railroad, or its ownership is vested in those who are prominent
in it. These railroads are usually operated in pretense at least
as common carriers, however improbable it may be that anyone
else will want to ship over them. And posing as connecting
carriers they have always been accustomed to see that they got
a good division as originating carriers out of the joint rate.
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But if this tap line really is a common carrier although the public
resorting to it is small, there would seem to be no way to prevent
this; but even so the Commission could be given power to pass
upon the propriety of the division. If, however, it is really a
plant facility it should not have any such standing whatsoever
to get what would virtually be a rebate, if it went beyond a
switching allowance, duly sanctioned by the Commission and
made to all shippers furnishing such facilities. It will be seen,
therefore, that by getting powers over divisions and allowances
the Commission in 19o6 got a measure of control over the
situation as a whole.
V.
By the Mann Act of 19io a number of amendments of great
importance were made to the Act to Regulate Commerce, where-
by the jurisdiction of the Commission was extended into new
fields and its powers over the companies subject to its jurisdiction
strengthened. Telephone and telegraph companies, whether wire
or wireless, were put under the power of the Commission so far
as Congress could constitutionally extend jurisdiction. The
fourth section of the Act relating to the long and short haul was
changed so as to put an end to the controversy as to the extent
of its provisions. The power over through rates was made posi-
tive, the whole matter being left to the Commission subject to
certain provisos. The power bf the Commission over rates and
schedules was made more extensive; in particular the Commis-
sion was given power to suspend advances in rates pending
investigation thereof. The power to compel switch connections
was given wider scopes with proper safeguards for the business
of the railroads. There were other amendments of less impor-
tance, such as change in the requirements as to annual reports
and further powers over accounts consequent thereon. Lawyers
who are prone to criticise the way in which legislation is drafted
cannot but admire the skill with which these various amendments
cured weaknesses in the powers of the Commission which
experience had brought to light.
The controversy which began a generation ago as to the true
meaning'of the long and short haul clause was finally settled
by this legislation by taking out the clause concerning similar
circumstances and conditions, by virtue of which the courts had
practically nullified the statute, and unequivocally making it
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unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of
this Act to charge or receive any greater compensation in the
aggregate for transportation for a shorter than for a longer
distance over the same line in the same direction the shorter
being included within the longer distance. The Commission was
confirmed in its jurisdiction to authorize carriers to make charges
which would otherwise be in violation of this section, by acting
upon applications from time to time and thereupon determining
the extent to which a designated common carrier might be
relieved from the operation of the section. It was provided as
a temporary measure that rates lawfully in effect at the time of
the passage of the Act might be kept in force provided applica-
tions under the section covering them had been duly filed; and
this situation has not altogether been cleared up at present.
Perhaps the most consequential change in the Act was the
provision giving the Commission special powers over new
schedules filed with it. The Commission may thereupon, either
upon complaint or upon its own initiative, without complaint at
once and, if it so orders, without answer being filed by the
interested carriers provided they have had reasonable notice,
enter upon a hearitig concerning the propriety of the change
proposed. Pending hearing and decision thereon, the Commis-
sion may by simply delivering to the carriers the reasons for
taking action suspend the operation of such schedule for four
months beyond the time when it would otherwise go into effect;
and if the hearing is not completed the time may be further
extended for a period not exceeding six months. After full
hearing, whether completed before or after the rate goes into
effect, the Commission may make such order as lies within its
jurisdiction over rates. At any hearing involving a rate sought
to be increased after the passage of the Act of 19io the burden
of proof to show that the increased rate or proposed increased
rates is just and reasonable shall be upon the common carriers,
and the Commission shall give to the hearing and decision of
such questions preference over all other questions pending before
it, and decide the same as speedily as possible.
The Hepburn Act provided that the Commission may, after
hearing on a complaint, establish through routes and joint rates
as the maximum to be charged and prescribe the division of
such rates, and the terms and conditions under which such
through routes shall be operated, when that may be necessary
to give effect to any provision of the Act, and the carriers com-
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plained of have refused or neglected to voluntarily establish
such through routes and joint rates, provided no reasonable or
satisfactory through route existed. The limitations which the
Supreme Court had found in the power of the Commission under
the 19o6 Amendment to establish through routes only when no
satisfactory through route existed as the courts themselves
viewed the evidence, was eliminated by making the clause in the
191o Amendment read so that the Commission in its own discre-
tion as to the necessity therefor, might act at any time in this
matter after hearing, whenever the carriers had failed to establish
joint rates themselves. However, a railroad was protected
against being shorthauled by an explicit clause in this Mann Act
to the effect that, in establishing such through route, the Commis-
sion shall not require any company, without its consent, to
embrace in such route substantially less than the entire length
of its railroad and of any intermediate railroad operated in
conjunction and under a common management or control there-
with, which lies between the termini of such proposed through
routes, unless to do so would make such through route unreason-
ably long as compared with another practicable through route
which could otherwise be established.
VI.
Included in the Panama Act of 1912 were various clauses of
great importance in extending the power of the Commission to
protect transportation by water, although the commerce moving
wholly by water is still excluded from the jurisdiction of the
Commission. Railroad ownership or control in any way of
water lines is forbidden save in particular cases where the Com-
mission may find that such ownership is in the public interest.
And to promote the competition of water lines it is provided
that the Commission shall have jurisdiction: (a) To establish
physical connection by spur tracks between the lines of a rail
carrier and the docks of a water carrier, whenever such connec-
tion is practicable and the amount of business offered is sufficient
to justify it; (b) to establish through routes and maximum joint
rates between and over such rail and water lines, and to deter-
mine all the terms and conditions under which such lines shall
be operated in the handling of the traffic embraced; (c) to
establish maximum proportional rates by rail to and from the
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ports to which the traffic is brought, or from which it is taken
by the water carrier, and to determine to what traffic and in
connection with what vessels and upon what terms and conditions
such rates shall apply; (d) if any rail carrier subject to the
Act to Regulate Commerce enters into arrangements with any
water carrier operating from a port in the United States to a
foreign country, for the handling of through business between
interior points of the United States and such foreign country,
the Commission may require such railway to enter into similar
arrangements with any or all other lines of steamships operating
from said port to the same foreign country.
By the Valuation Act of 1913, the Commission was directed
to proceed forthwith to investigate and ascertain the value of all
the property owned or used by every common carrier subject
to its jurisdiction. Every fact of any sort relating to the prop-
erties of the carrier at any time in their existence which might
be pertinent is demanded specially. Not only the original cost,
as nearly as that can be ascertained, but the present value as
exactly as that can be appraised. Nor is Congress contented
with this determination of actual conditions, past and present,
so far as by human assiduity and ingenuity the past can be
unravelled and the present be estimated. The Commission is
asked further what it would cost to reproduce these properties
new at the present time, and what figures would be set upon them
if from the estimated cost of reproduction were deducted their
indicated depreciation in their present state. And then follow
other questions as to past operations and present conditions .of
still more difficulty, designed to meet problems of valuation which
are bothering even those most conversant with these matters.
The Commission is not merely asked to collect all this data and
make all these appraisals as to things tangible and intangible,
actual and hypothetical. It is told to classify all these things
and make comparisons between them, and to state the reasons
of these differences and the basis of these values.
By the Clayton Act of 1914, jurisdiction to enforce compliance
with certain sections so far as carriers subject to the Act are
concerned is vested in the Commission. For instance, there is
the section providing that no corporation engaged in commerce
shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock or other share capital of another corporation also engaged
in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to
substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose
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stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition;
and that no corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of two or
more corporations engaged in commerce where the effect of such
acquisition, or the use of such stock by the voting or granting
of proxies or otherwise, may be to substantially lessen competi-
tion between such corporations. But by explicit proviso nothing
therein contained shall be construed to prohibit any common
carrier subject to the laws to regulate commerce from aiding in
the construction of branches or short lines so located as to
become feeders to the main line of the company so aiding in
such construction or from acquiring or owning all or any part
of the stock of such branch lines, nor to prevent any such
common carrier from acquiring and owning all or any part of
the stock of a branch or short line constructed by an independent
company where there is no substantial competition between the
company owning the branch line so constructed and the company
owning the main line acquiring the property or an interest therein,
nor to prevent such common carrier from extending any of
its lines through the medium of the acquisition of stock or other-
wise of any other such common carrier where there is no sub-
stantial competition between the company extending its lines and
the company whose stock, property, or an interest therein is so
acquired.
In the pamphlet which is kept currently in print by the
Government Printing Office collecting between its covers all
the laws giving jurisdiction to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion the history of the fundamental legislation is thus given:
"An Act to Regulate Commerce, approved February 4, 1887, as
amended by an act approved March 2, 1889 (25 Statutes at
Large, 855), by an act approved February 1o, 1891 (26 Statutes
at Large, 743), by an act approved February 8, 1895 (28 Statutes
at Large, 643), by an act approved June 29, 19o6 (34 Statutes
at Large, 584), by a joint resolution approved June 30, 19o6
(34 Statutes at Large, 838), by an act approved April 13, 1908
(35 Statutes at Large, 60), by an act approved February 25,
1909 (35 Statutes at Large, 648), by an act approved June
18, 1910 (36 Statutes at Large, 539), by an act approved August
24, 1912 (37 Statutes at Large, 566), and by an act approved
March 1, 1913 (37 Statutes at Large, 701)." It is thus by
amendment of the Act from time to time that the expansion of
the scope of the function of the Commission has largely been
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effected; but incidentally Congress now and then turns the
determination of particular matters over to the Commission, as
the list of the other laws printed in this same official pamphlet
will show: District Court Jurisdiction Act; Compulsory Testi-
mony Act; Immunity of Witnesses Act; Elkins Act; Expediting
Act; Clayton Antitrust Act; Government-Aided Railroad and
Telegraph Act; Lake Erie and Ohio River Ship Canal Act;
Parcel Post Act; Safety Appliances Act; Reports of Accidents
Act; Medals of Honor Act; Hours of Service Act; Ash Pan
Act; Transportation of Explosives Act; Boiler Inspection Act;
and Block Signals Act.
VII.
As I view the evolution disclosed by this narrative, it seems
to me that it is clearly indicated that in its next stage the Inter-
state Commerce Commission will be empowered to give relief in
particular cases of bad service brought to its attention as it has
been granted over improper rates. All over the country the state
commissions are being given the same measures of power over
service which they have over rates. I have often before stated
my belief that commissions should have no more jurisdiction in
these matters than that of a quasi-judicial body fully empowered
to give relief where complaints are found. I do not believe that
a commission should be given authority to hand down a new
schedule of rates or make up a new time table, as it may in
some of the 9tates. The Interstate Commerce Commission has
-never been given greater power over rates than to reduce particu-
lar rates, and then only if the existing rates are in fact clearly
found to be unreasonable; and it would not, therefore, be given
wider jurisdiction over service than to remedy particular defects
plainly shown in proper proceedings. The reason why I do not
believe in letting a commission initiate policies is that I do not
feel that a commission should not have the power of manage-
ment; nor do I believe in letting a Commission go outside the
record in the proceedings before it and make orders upon its
own preconceived notion. But if these limitations are respected
the railroads have little to fear from the expert judgment of the
national commission on complaint of any dereliction of the duties
which a railroad owes to its patrons; and in any event the courts
and the constitution will protect them from unreasonable require-
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ments. We may, therefore, view with equanimity the approach
of the time when the Interstate Commerce Commission will have
its jurisdiction extended by further amendments to the Act to
Regulate Commerce so as to include every phase of railroad
operations affecting transportation between the states or with
foreign countries.
BRUCE WYMAN.
50 CoNGREss STRMT,
BOSTON, MASS.
